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Abstract
Human capital accumulation by the poor is only possible if a minimum level
of health and well-being has been attained. When families do not have enough
resources to invest in the satisfaction of basic needs and health care, and ﬁnance
is not available for this purpose, a poverty trap exists with low health, education
and income. These poverty traps may persist if policies ﬁnancing education are
applied which do not also address deﬁciencies in nutrition and health impairing
human potential, and in particular early child development. This link between
health and education contributes to explain the important, long-term eﬀects of
nutrition and health on economic growth and implies that nutrition and health
play a causal role in the persistence of inequality and in the eﬀects of inequality
on growth.1. Introduction
Education has become an indispensable condition for raising living standards and
achieving economic growth. However, in the absence of appropriate public policies,
low levels of well-being and health may constitute a barrier to the accumulation
of human capital that the poor may be unable to overcome. Successful education
requires a minimal level of health1 that depends on the satisfaction of basic needs,
on addressing speciﬁc health problems. We show that, when families cannot bor-
row to satisfy their basic needs, the minimal health requirement may give rise to
a poverty trap that may not dissapear if funds are made available for education
but not for basic needs and health2 . The poverty trap gives rise to two classes
of families, one poorer, less healthy and unskilled and the other richer, health-
ier and skilled. The health-related poverty trap we propose can be thought of
as an addition and continuation of the eﬃciency theory of wages, that explains
the possibility of a low productivity trap due to low nutrition (e.g. Leibenstein,
1957; Mazumdar, 1959; Mirlees, 1975; Stiglitz, 1976; Bliss and Stern, 1978; Das-
1We include nutrition in ‘health’. What we are referring to can also be thought of as early
child development.
2We shall talk about funds becoming available for the satisfaction of basic needs and health
to stress that somebody has to ﬁnance the expenditure, for example through private credit or
through public expediture that may be repaid through higher taxes in the future by recipients.
This is more suggestive to non-economists than the somewhat criptic credit restriction that is
the economic technical term.
2gupta and Ray, 1984, 1986; Dasgupta, 1991) and documents substantial eﬀects
of nutrition on labor productivity (for surveys see Barlow, 1979; Martorell and
Arrayave, 1984; Strauss, 1985; Srinivasan, 1992; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988).
Here we suggest that low nutrition and health in children may lead to low levels
of education and therefore to an intergenerational poverty trap.
Identifying this health-related poverty trap contributes a new dimension to the
study of the economic eﬀects of health. It is remarkable that although the basic
importance of health is well recognized in the study of poverty and development,
for example by its inclusion in the Human Development Index (United Nations De-
velopment Programme, 1990), health-related poverty traps do not received much
attention in the empirical and theoretical literature. In Mayer-Foulkes (2004),
evidence is given for the actual existence of such a trap. The distribution of Mex-
ican households divides into a twin-peaked distribution with two classes, one in
which both spouses have education at or below lower secondary schooloing and
the other in which both spouses have more than 15 years of schooling. Moreover,
early child nutrition is found to be an important determinant of permanence in
school. The possible existence of health-reated poverty traps is also supported by
Mayer-Foulkes (2002b) in a study showing the existence of life expectancy con-
vergence clubs. The distribution of life expectancy was twin-peaked in 1962 and
31997, with half the countries in the lower peak shifting to the higher peak during
the period. The remaining countries were trapped in life expectancies shorter
than 55 years. Ranis, Stewart and Ram´ ırez (2000) study the interrelationship
between human development and economic growth. They ﬁnd that it is more
likely for countries to experience virtous cycles in economic growth if they ﬁrst
experience virtous cycles in human development. In more recent work, Arcand
(2001) shows that nutrition has substantial eﬀects on economic growth both di-
rectly and through life expectancy and possibly schooling. Mayer-Foulkes (2002c)
shows that countries can be divided into convergence clusters according to their
income and life expectancy trajectories, with the lowest group characterized by
very low health achievements. Thus, overcoming health-related barriers to the
accumulation of human capital may be an important preconditon to achieving
higher income levels.
In the literature the main antecedents to our poverty trap are the low-nutrition
trap mentioned above (due to the eﬀects of food consumption on labor produc-
tivity) and the impact of poverty on patience’ or time-preferences, which may
depend on prospective life expectancy. Diﬀerences in time preferences are sup-
p o r t e db yU Sd a t a ,w h i c hs h o wt h a td i ﬀereces in discount rates between white,
college-educated families in the top 5 percent of the labor income distribution
4and non-white families without an education in the bottom ﬁfth percentile can be
up to 7% (Lawrance, 1991). If the poor are more impatient it follows that they
will experience slower economic growth (see for example work in recursive pref-
erences by Hertzendorf, 1995 and Mantel, 1998). The income distribution may
bifurcate when agents maximize health using endogenous discount rates them-
selves dependent on health (Mayer, 1999). Here, however, we examine a diﬀerent
causal channel: the eﬀect of health on education. Our approach deepens the lit-
erature that explains the persistence of poverty through the presence of credit
constraints (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993). We show that
the constraints that exist on borrowing for the satisfaction of basic needs and
health, themselves necessary ingredients for education, may make acquiring the
later impossible even when ﬁnance for education is available.
The strong empirical correlation that exists between aggregate measures of
health and income has been recognized since Preston’s 1975 cross-country study,
which showed life expectancy to be positively correlated with income. In a more
recent study, Pritchett and Summers (1996) also corroborate that countries with
higher incomes enjoy higher health.
The opposite causal relation running from health to income, productivity and
economic growth has recently received considerable attention, partly because of
5the policy questions that it is related to (World Health Organization, 1999, 2001;
Pan American Health Organization, 2001). Studies by Fogel (1991, 1994a,b) and
Fogel and Wimmer (1992) established that nutrition and health have had an
important historical impact, accounting for up to a third of economic growth.
Arora (2001) ﬁnds that there is an exogenous component to the dynamics of
health-related variables to which the dynamics of growth are sensitive and not
vice versa, in a study using 62 health-related 100- to 125-year time series for nine
advanced economies. The percentage of total growth attributed to these variables
lies between 26 and 40 percent. Devlin and Hansen (2001) ﬁnd Granger causality
running in both directions between health and GDP in OECD countries. These
economic history ﬁndings have been conﬁrmed by macroeconomic empirical stud-
ies of economic growth along the lines set out in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994), Barro (1996), Easterly and Levine (1997),
Gallup and Sachs (2000), Knowles and Owen (1995, 1997), Sachs and Warner
(1995, 1997) and Mayer et al (2001) have found that health, measured usually
as life expectancy or low mortality, has a signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect. Bhargava
et al. (2001) ﬁnd, addressing issues of endogeneity and reverse causality, that
adult survival rates have a positive eﬀect on GDP growth rates in low-income
countries. Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) carefully distinguish health from
6education and experience and ﬁnd that it has a positive, sizable eﬀect on ag-
gregate output. This eﬀect continues to be felt several decades into the future
(Mayer 2001a,b, Mayer-Foulkes 2002a). In a study on the productivity associated
to health, Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Wilson (1999) conduct two comparable dy-
namic panel studies on Subsaharan Africa and the OECD, each with more than
twenty time observations, ﬁnding that health has considerable, signiﬁcant, eﬀects
on the rate of economic growth. Weil (2001a) conﬁrms Fogel’s results for Britain,
ﬁnds similar results for Korea over the period 1962-1995, and estimates that health
accounts for about 17% of the variance in cross-country 1988 productivity levels.
As mentioned above, Arcand (2001) shows that nutrition has substantial eﬀects
on economic growth, and ﬁnds evidence for the existence of a nutritional-related
poverty trap.
At higher levels of income the eﬀect of health on economic growth may be
negligible or even negative (Van-Zon and Muysken, 2001).
An extensive series of microeconomic studies have used a human capital frame-
work to measure the eﬀects of health and education on individual earnings and pro-
ductivity (e.g. Schultz, 1992, 1997; Thomas, Schoeni and Strauss, 1997; Strauss
and Thomas, 1998; Savedoﬀ and Schultz, 2000; see Strauss and Thomas (1995)
and Schultz, 1999, for surveys). However, by and large these studies have found
7smaller magnitudes for the eﬀects of health, and none has been considered the pos-
sibility of a poverty trap. This may be a contributing factor for the discrepancy
between the macro and micro results. For suppose that there exist thresholds of
health and well-being that lead to distinct equilibria at diﬀerent levels of human
capital. Then macroeconomic cross-country studies, whose samples cover con-
siderable diﬀerences in wealth and health, will tend to span these equilibria and
measure the health-related diﬀerences in economic performance. On the other
hand microeconomic studies will tend to measure marginal health eﬀects reduced
by the proximity to local equilibria.
Recent studies ﬁnd that the indirect eﬀects of health on income that occur
through the impact of early child development on life-long education may be
much more important than the direct eﬀects of health on labor productivity of
these studies. In an extensive, up to date study also reporting on progress in the
provision of vitamin and micronutrient supplements, The Micronutrient Initiative
and United Nations Children’s Fund (2004) report that as many as a third of
the world’s people do not meet their physical and intellectual potential because of
vitamin and mineral (VM) deﬁciencies.3 At the same time, they report that “con-
3Verbatim from the report, iodine deﬁciency is estimated to have lowered the intellectual
capacity of almost all of the nations reviewed by as much as 10 to 15 percentage points. Iron
deﬁciency in the 6-to-24 month age group is impairing the mental development of approximately
8trolling vitamin and mineral deﬁciency is an aﬀordable opportunity to improve
the lives of two billion people and strengthen the pulse of economic development.”
Along similar lines, the recent “Copenhagen Concensus”, lists amongst the thir-
teen top world-wide development projects with highest beneﬁtt oc o s tr a t i o s ,t e n
which are health related: Diseases Control of HIV/AIDS (1st); providing micro nu-
trients (2nd); control of malaria (4th); development of new agricultural technologies
to combat malnutrition (5th); sanitation & water: small-scale water technology
(6th), community-managed water supply and sanitation (7th) ,a n dr e s e a r c ho n
water productivity in food production (8th); direct subsidies for improving infant
and child nutrition (11th) and low birth weight (12th); and scaled-up basic health
services (13th).
In a study obtaining the 2003 Kenneth J. Arrow prize to the best article on
40% to 60% of the developing world’s children. Vitamin A deﬁciency is compromising the
immune systems of approximately 40% of the developing world’s underlives and leading to the
deaths of approximately 1 million young children each year. Iodine deﬁciency in pregnancy
is causing almost 18 million babies a year to be born mentally impaired. Folate deﬁciency is
responsible for approximately 200,000 severe birth defects every year in the 80 countries for which
Damage Assessment Reports have been issued (and perhaps as many as 50,000 more in the rest
of the world). The deﬁciency is also associated with approximately 1 in every 10 deaths from
heart disease in adults. Severe iron deﬁciency anemia is also causing the deaths of more than 60,
000 young women a year in pregnancy and childbirth. Iron deﬁciency in adults is so widespread
as to lower the energies of nations and the productivity of workforces - with estimated losses
of up to 2% of GDP in the worst aﬀected countries. “Vitamin and mineral deﬁciencies,” says
the World Bank “impose high economic costs on virtually every developing nation.” In practice,
vitamin and mineral deﬁciencies overlap and interact. Half of children with VM deﬁciency are
in fact suﬀering from multiple deﬁciencies - adding up an immeasurable burden on individuals,
on health services, on education systems, and on families caring for children who are disabled
or mentally impaired.
9health economics, based on the 1958 National Child Development Study, which
follows all children born in Great Britain in the week of March 3, 1958 from birth
to age 42, Case, Fertig and Paxson (2003) clarify the origin of the income gradients
observed in adult health by ﬁnding that early childhood health is a critical link
through which household wealth is transmitted to the next generation, forming
the basis for future adult income and health
At the individual level, a clear causal connection has been established running
from diﬀerences in income to diﬀerences in health (Deaton, 1999a,b). In a study of
1.3 million deaths in the U.S., Rogot et al. (1992) show, for example, that in 1980
the life expectancy of men at age 25 in the bottom income group (those with less
than $5,000 of family income) was 43.6 years while for men at the top (more than
$50,000) it was 53.6 years. The analogous expectancies at age 45, 26.2 versus 39.0
bear a similar proportion. In a cross-country study, Bidani and Ravallion (1997)
ﬁnd that people with an income below US$2 per day have a life expectancy nine
years shorter than those above this income level. This “mortality gradient” held
in the last century as well. According to Dora and Steckel (1997) the distribution
of health health diverged in the nineteenth century and converged in the twentieth
in the U.S. Amongst the causes they cite are rising income inequality. It is also
found that early-life health has a large impact on longevity. Analogously, in a
10study on the regions of Great Britain over the period 1861-1971, Lee (1991) ﬁnds
the inequality of infant mortality rates diverged during the late nineteenth century
to a peak inequality in 1921/31, converging since then towards equality, and relates
these variations to the density of housing occupancy and industrialization. Ferrie
(2000) ﬁnds a strong and negative relationship between household wealth and
mortality in the U.S. in 1860 and a somewhat weaker negative relationship between
occupational status and mortality in 1850. Even when the U.S. population was
largely rural and agricultural, changes in the distribution of income and wealth
would have had a large impact on mortality rates and life expectancies.
The opposite causal connection, from health to income inequality, has not been
neatly addressed. Our model shows that health inequality may be a factor in the
transmission and persistence of income inequality, explaining one channel through
of such a causal connection. This theory ﬁnds some support in Dora (1998), who
shows that health inequality was transmitted across generations, using data on
maternal height for the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century. It suggests that
some of the causes of the long-term changes in the distribution of income and
health that occured for instance in the U.S. and Great Britain may run through
health.
The model we propose focuses speciﬁcally on the eﬀects of minimal health
11requirements for acquiring an education. Let us not forget that in the develop-
ing world, 790 million people do not have enough food to eat, while 1.3 billion
people do not have access to safe drinking water (Weil, 2001b). The eﬀects of
health and nutrition on education in developing countries have been studied in
some detail in an attempt to detect speciﬁc links which may be addressed cost-
eﬀectively (World Bank, 1993). As part of the eﬀort to improve and extend basic
education services and to universalize primary schooling conducted by the UNDP,
UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank, survey studies have been undertaken
on the consequences on education that low nutrition can have (Levinger, 1994).
The following obstacles that nutrition and health pose to the achievement of
child quality (a reconceptualization of the objectives of education that echoes the
essence of the concept of human capital formation) are documented. Temporary
hunger is related to inattentiveness. Protein-energy malnutrition (especially in
early childhood), often worsened by a child’s parasite load, is signiﬁcantly related
to poorer cognitive and school performance indicators, and to worsened general
conceptual ability, problem solving, mental agility and capacity. Micronutrient
deﬁciency disorders also impair school performance. Iodine deﬁciencies are asso-
ciated with reduced intelligence, psico-motor retardation, mental and neurologic
damage, and cretinism. Iron deﬁciency anemia, which aﬀects 1.3 billion people, of
12whom 210 million are school age children, has been associated with lower mental
and motor development test scores. Vitamin A deﬁciencies are associated with
eyesight problems and other conditions. Helminthic infection generates very high
levels of morbidity associated with impaired cognitive function, absenteeism, un-
der enrollement, and attrition. Untreated sensory impairment, such as vision or
auditory problems constitute signiﬁcant educational risk factors. 42.8% of the chil-
dren under 5 in 21 Latin American countries4 show moderate and severe stunting,
a clear sign of malnutrition that is likely to be associated with poorer educational
performance.
Levinger (op. cit.) notes that some of these problems may be overcome by
relatively inexpensive interventions such as nutritional rehabilitation, medical care
and cognitive stimulation. However, it is quite clear that this type of measure may
be insuﬃcient if it is not accompanied by a substantial rise in the satisfaction of
basic needs in general, if children are to become succesful, productive individuals.
Larrea, Freire and Lutter (1998) show that stunting due to malnutrition becomes
established in the ﬁrst 2 to 3 years of life, supporting the hypothesis of a health
threshold for education in the abscence of timely funding for nutrition. Programs
4The countries are: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
13supplementing nutrition in school may not reach children soon enough. Stunting
has been shown to be cumulative and non-reversible and therefore provides an
excellent measure of chronic malnutrition and its eﬀects. A whole literature exists
showing that malnutrition leads to lower longevity, chronic diseases and lower
cognitive status (Sch¨ urch and Scrimshaw, 1987).
Recent studies have built from the concept of child quality to a more ample
concept of early child development (ECD), the combination of physical, mental
and social development in the early years of life. Programs in ECD commonly
address nutrition, health, cognitive development, and social interaction of children
in the early years (Myers 1992; Young 1997). Children participating in ECD pro-
grams receive psychosocial stimulation, nutritional supplementation, and health
care, and their parents receive training in eﬀective childcare. The importance of
ECD for school performance and for the crucial rapid development of the brain
is supported by the following extensive scientiﬁc evidence in neurophysics, pedi-
atrics, medicine, child development, education, sociology and economics (Cynader
and Frost 1999; Mc-Cain and Mustard 1999; Myers 1992; Young 1997). Chil-
dren who have participated in these programs show higher intelligence quotients
and improvements in practical reasoning, eye and hand coordination, hearing
and speech, and reading readiness (Myers 1992). Grade repetition and dropout
14rates are lower, performance at school is higher, and the probability that a child
will progress to higher levels of education increases (Barnett 1995; Barnett 1998;
Grantham-McGregor et al 1997; Karoly et al 1998; Schweinhart et al 1993).
ECD also beneﬁts life long health. It is associated with decreased morbidity
and mortality among children, fewer cases of malnutrition and stunting, improved
personal hygiene and health care, and fewer instances of child abuse. ECD also
leads to better socially adapted adults who are less aggressive, more cooperative
(Kagit¸ cibasi 1996; Karoly et al 1998), and show reduced criminal behavior and
less delinquency, (Schweinhart et al 1993; Yoshikawa 1995; Zigler, Taussig, and
Black 1992).5
Our model thus assumes that a minimum level of health and well being –
health, for short– is necessary during infancy and childhood to be able to obtain
adequate returns for investment in education. Health aﬀects the returns of educa-
tion 1) by enabling the formation of child quality in the early years and throughout
youth, bringing the eﬃciency of education to a viable level; 2) by raising skilled
and unskilled labor eﬃciency and 3) through longevity, itself inﬂuenced by early
health, by lengthening the time during which education will yield a return. Al-
though health also aﬀects the eﬃciency of unskilled labor, it does so to a lesser
5We closely follow Van der Gaag (2002) in this exposition.
15extent, because of the cognitive and mental dimensions involved in education,
and because of the increased returns on investment implied by longevity, given a
suﬃcient level of health. Thus it will not be feasible, or worthwhile, to choose to
train for skilled instead of unskilled labor below some minimum level of health.
The presence of this threshold health level implies the possibility of multiple
equilibria. For suppose that skilled work is a viable option. If, for example,
unskilled laborers cannot in equilibrium provide their children with the minimum
level of health necessary for succesful training, then if the satisfaction of these
needs are not ﬁnanced then the condition of unskilled labor will represent a low
equilibrium (a poverty trap). In this situation, even if educational expenditures
are ﬁnanced, children will be trapped in low-wage, unskilled labor, remaining in
the cycle of poverty.6 Only policies ﬁnancing basic needs and health as well as
education will end this cycle. Note that this includes ﬁnancing the satisfaction of
needs closely associated with basic consumption. Public programs making food
available for children in schools, are examples of policies extending credit for the
satisfaction of basic needs, to be paid by the taxes of higher earning adults. Basic
food subsidies, such as for the maize tortilla in Mexico are also examples, where
6We make the supposition that skilled and unskilled labor are substitutes. Thus unskilled
labor never becomes scarce. This is realistic at low skill levels.
16similar principles have been extended to adults who may be trapped in poverty
for a variety of reasons.7 The simultaneous support of basic needs and education
has been implemented in public programs. The nature of the nutrition and health
thresholds involved implies that pre-school infants should also be aided, as in the
Progresa program in Mexico.
Our model formalize this argument and implies that both income and health
tend to polarize into a bimodal distribution, one mode poorer, less healthy and
unskilled and the other richer, healthier and skilled. An immediate consequence
is that the initial level and distribution of wealth matters for macroeconomic
performance, as in Galor and Zeira (1993), since it will determine the proportions
of the population that are attracted to the skilled and unskilled equilibria, and
this in turn will determine the aggregate level of human capital and the rate
of economic growth. Our model therefore implies that policies promoting the
satisfaction of basic needs and health can have an important impact on economic
growth by unlocking the potential of the poor population. From the historical
point of view, the replacement of physical with human capital accumulation can
be shown to generate an inverted U Kuznets (1955) curve for the distribution of
7The tortilla plays a central role in the diet of the poor in Mexico. It is a bread equivalent
originated in prehispanic culture.
17income, in the presence of credit constraints that slow the accumulation of human
capital by the poor (Galor, 2000). Our model implies a) that poor health may
play an important causal role in this process, by invigorating the credit constraint,
making the acquisition of education more diﬃcult, and lowering its rate of return,
and b) that long-term distribution changes will also be reﬂected in the distribution
of health itself. As mentioned before, Dora and Steckel (1997) and Lee (1991)
show that the health distribution did in fact follow a Kuznets curve in the U.S.
and Great Britain respectively, and Dora (1998) shows, further, that there was
an intergenerational transmission of health inequality. The full extent to which
health has contributed to the intergenerational transmission of wealth and to the
persistence of inequality remain to be investigated.
It is remarkable that the prediction of a bimodal health distribution actually
holds at the cross-country level for life expectancy. Figures 1 and 2 show the
histograms of life expectancy for 159 countries in 1962 and 1997. These are
clearly twin-peaked, although the size of the lower peak was considerably reduced
in the period. The distributions are consistent with the presence of health-related
poverty traps, and with convergence clubs (Mayer-Foulkes, 2002b). Disparities in
wealth are numerically much larger than disparities in life expectancy. Thus per-
capita income could mainly reﬂect the income of the skilled and the rich, capital
18owning, population. This may explain why a bimodal cross-country distribution
is observed in health but not in income per capita. However, a long-term tendency
towards the stratiﬁcation of income at the cross-country level has been noted for
the period 1961-1988 (Quah, 1997). Our model provides an important mechanism
through which the initial health disparities already present in 1960 (see Figure 1)
could have generated the subsequent income stratiﬁc a t i o n ,i na ne n v i r o n m e n ti n
which the premium to education increased and skills became ever more important
as sources of both income and technological change.
Consistently with the model’s implications, the descriptive data in Table 1
show a divergent pattern of economic growth between countries at diﬀerent levels
of health for the periods 1960-1980 and 1980-1998, whose causes remain to be
fully unravelled.
Further evidence for the presence of health related poverty traps is found in
Mayer-Foulkes (2003). This study uses stature, which is determined in the early
stages of life and is a predictor of life-long health and longevity, as a measure
of early child nutrition. It shows that all of the conditions necessary for a low-
income trap are present in Mexico and that health is an important determinant
of permanence in school. A transition matrix analysis supports the presence of a
barrier to education at 9 years of schooling, and a numerical policy experiment
19shows that a 5 cm average increase in stature (which South Korea experienced in
one generation) would overcome this barrier and lead to higher levels of education.
Thus nutrition, health and early child development must be integral elements of
a program in human resources that must address all levels of education.
The non-concave, threshold eﬀect we propose implies that market forces on
their own are insuﬃcient to promote the optimal accumulation of human capital.
Empirical studies may thus need to go beyond the usual concavity and convergence
assumptions to fully understand the impact of health on economic growth. Such
empirical research will uncover the full extent to which non-concave health eﬀects
need to be taken into account in the formulation of policy for health, education
and economic growth for the poor.
The next two sections contain the economic model and the conclusions of the
paper.
2. The model
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which the inputs of production
are capital and eﬀective units of labor. Aggregate output Y is given by aggregate
20capital K and aggregate eﬀective labor H (human capital) according to
Y = F(K,H), (2.1)
where F is a neoclassical production function. The eﬀective units of labor that
each person commands will depend on her health and education. Let y = Y/H,
k = K/H be output and capital per eﬀective unit of labor, so that
y = f(k). (2.2)
Here f(k)=F(K/H,1). We shall suppose that the economy is small and open,
so that the interest rate r is ﬁxed. Since r = f0(k), it follows that k and w, the
salary per eﬀective unit of labor, are ﬁxed at levels given by
k = f
0−1(r),w= f(k) − kf
0(k). (2.3)
Even though F is homogenous of degree one, we assume that there are decreasing
returns to investment in human capital, so that in fact the economy does not
sustain growth.
We now describe the household decisions. Each generation lives for two pe-
21riods. In the ﬁrst period of life (childhood) a person born at time t receives a
bequest bt from his parent and decides how much to spend on basic needs and
health vt (vitality), and whether to invest resources et on an education or to work
as an unskilled laborer.8 Prior to the application of any government policies, these
expenditures are subject to a credit restriction
0 ≤ ht + et ≤ bt. (2.4)
In the second period of life (adulthood) each person will work, earn, and decide
on consumption and bequest levels ct+1,b t+1.
Health and unskilled work
Second period health is a function of expenditures ht on basic needs and health,
including such consumption items as food, clothing, shelter, as well as speciﬁcally
medical expenses, preventive or otherwise. Health, in turn, aﬀects future pro-
ductivity and longevity. In the case when the choice is unskilled work, we shall
suppose that, once all of the eﬀects of health are taken into account, second-period
eﬃciency units (including a factor for the duration of the working life) take the
8It is perfectly consistent to think that some of the inheritance bt is actually transmitted in





where 0 < ξ < 1 is the elasticity of eﬃciency with respect to expenditure in
health and basic needs. The subscript ‘L’ stands for ‘labor’ or unskilled, while ‘E’
will stand for ‘educated’ or skilled. Thus there are decreasing returns to health
through productivity and longevity. If the child chooses unskilled work and does
n o ti n v e s ti ne d u c a t i o n ,et = 0 and her second period income yt+1 is given by
yL =m a x
ht
[wEL(ht)+( bt − ht)(1 + r)], (2.6)
where bt−ht is the portion of the bequest that is saved. In view of credit restriction
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where the intercept is
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23Second period income is a concave function of bequests so long as these lie below









Any bequests above this level are saved, yielding a linear portion of second period
income, whose intercept is the gains of investment in health y0
L (see Figure 3).
Health and skilled work
Health has an additional set of eﬀects in the case when the child decides to
acquire an education. When basic and health needs are satisﬁed at too low a
level, the productivity of education is too low to give any returns. In eﬀect,
a minimum level of health is required to successfully embark on a career as a
skilled worker. Also, the eﬀect of longevity is greater in the case of education,
b e c a u s ei th a sa ni m p a c to nt h et i m ea v a ilable for training. This implies that
the returns to education are more than proportional to longevity. Therefore the
returns to expenditures on health are greater than in the unskilled case. We shall
assume, keeping to simple functions as before, that second-period eﬃciency units
24(including a factor for the duration of the working life) take the form




h0 is the health threshold that is necessary to embark on an education. We assume
that health and education have diminishing returns to health and education both
singly and jointly, so 0 < η, ε, η + ε < 1. Thus second-period income will be
yE,t+1 =m a x
ht,et
[wEE(ht,e t)+( bt − ht − et)(1 + r)], (2.10)
where now bt − ht − et is the portion of the bequest that is saved. In view of the
credit restriction (2.4), the maximized income is
yE,t+1(bt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
00 ≤ bt ≤ h0,
wAE
ηηεε
(η+ε)η+ε(bt − h0)η+ε h0 ≤ bt ≤ ˜ bE,
y0















(1 + r). (2.12)
Above the threshold level of investment in health h0, second period income is a
25concave function of bequests so long as bequests can pay for the threshold level of
health h0 but are insuﬃcient to fund the optimal level ˜ bE = ˜ hE+˜ eE of investment
in health and education for pursuing skilled work, where














Any bequests above ˜ bE are saved, yielding the linear portion of second period
income, whose intercept is y0
E, the gains of investment to health and education.
The choice between skilled and unskilled work
We assume that any person whose bequest is large enough to invest the optimal
amounts in health and education will prefer skilled to unskilled work. In other







This states that the gains to investment in health and education to perform skilled
work are larger than the gains to investment in health for performing unskilled
work. Note that for bequests below h0, investment in education is futile, so yL(b) >
26yE(b)=0f o rb ≤ h0. Hence there is some switching value ˆ b>h 0 at which the
second period incomes are equal,
yE(ˆ b)=yL(ˆ b). (2.16)
We assume for simplicity that ˆ b is unique. This is the economically relevant case
and is almost always the case for the functions we have chosen. Then we have the
following Proposition (see Figure 3).
Proposition 2.1. Given a bequest bt, the child chooses to perform unskilled work
in the second period if bt ≤ ˆ b and skilled work if bt ≥ ˆ b.I n t h e ﬁrst case the
amount min{˜ bL,b t} will be invested in health, while in the second case the amount
min{˜ bE,b t} will be invested in health and education, h0 being dedicated to health
and the remaining amount being allocated between health and education accord-
ing to et
ht−h0 = ε
η. Any remaining resources will be saved.
Preferences
In the second period a person divides her wealth between her personal con-







The budget restriction is
ct+1 + bt+1 ≤ yt+1(bt)=m a x {yL,t+1(bt),y E,t+1(bt)}, (2.18)
where y(bt) is second period income. Skilled or unskilled work is chosen so as to
maximize income, because this will maximize utility. The Cobb-Douglass prefer-
ences imply the proportional allocation
ct+1 = γyt+1(bt), (2.19)
bt+1 =( 1 − γ)yt+1(bt). (2.20)
Hence the resulting indirect utility is given by
ut+1 = κyt+1(bt). (2.21)
where κ = γγ(1−γ)(1−γ). Equation (2.20) for bt+1, yields a dynamical system for
bequests from which the dynamics of the remaining variables follow.
28Bequest dynamics under the full credit constraint
We shall assume that the bequest dynamics that we are describing lead to
stable equilibria. For this we need the condition
(1 − γ)(1 + r) < 1, (2.22)
Otherwise what will be observed is permanent income growth through saving,
independently of whether skilled or unskilled labor is chosen.
The bequest dynamics may have one equilibrium, which may be skilled or
unskilled, or two equilibria, one of each. We shall assume that there exists a









E) < 1, so that children choosing education leave their own children
the same bequest.9 There always exists a bequest level b∗
L when unskilled wages
are too low for families to provide their children with these minimum levels of
well-being, and these cannot be ﬁnanced, at which the analogous statement holds
9Generically, if the curve (1−γ)zE(bt) intersects the 45◦ line it does so twice. The condition




L =( 1− γ)yL(b
∗
L). (2.24)
We have the following Proposition (see Figure 4).
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that unskilled and skilled labor equilibrium bequest
levels b∗
L,b ∗
E exist according to the deﬁnitions above, and that
b
∗
L < ˆ b<b
∗
E, (2.25)
so that unskilled work is prefered at b∗
L, while skilled work is prefered at b∗
E.T h e n




is chosen, no expenditure takes place on education, and expenditure on health is
h
∗













E − h0),˜ hE}, (2.27)
e
∗





E − h0), ˜ eE}, (2.28)
30may be suboptimal, because of the credit restriction, in which case they will take
up the full bequest. Bequests, expenditures on health and education, and second
period income, are all less at the unskilled than at the skilled equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the returns to investment in health are locally con-
cave at each equilibrium. Thus for example a regression performed on the income
of a sample of countries or individuals located at one or at both equilibria, in-
cluding some measure of health and its square as independent variables, would
detect decreasing returns to health, even after taking account of endogeneity, as
in Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson (1999). Detecting the threshold eﬀects requires
speciﬁc econometric methods.
Policies lifting the credit restriction
What happens if the credit restriction is partially lifted and an educational
credit (EC) becomes available? The credit restriction now takes the form
0 ≤ ht ≤ bt (2.29)
instead of (2.4). Maximization (2.10) therefore yields the following second period





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
00 ≤ bt ≤ h0,
(1 − ε)( ε
1+r)
ε
1−ε [wAE(ht − h0)η]
1
1−ε h0 ≤ bt ≤ ˜ hE,
y0
E + bt(1 + r) bt ≥ ˜ bE.
(2.30)
The shape of yEC
E,t+1(bt) is very similar to that of yE,t+1(bt). It is zero below bt = h0
and rises as a concave function to reach the same linear function but somewhat
sooner, at bt = ˜ hE rather than bt = ˜ hE +˜ eE,b e c a u s en o w˜ eE can be borrowed.







We shall assume that in the presence of these constraints there exists a viable
stable skilled equilibrium, whose existence may or not depend on the presence of










and (1 − γ)yEC0
E (bEC
E ) < 1. As u ﬃcient condition for the existence of this equi-
librium is the existence of such an equilibrium b∗
E in the absence of educational
32credits.











L + bt(1 + r). (2.34)
In this case we let bFC be the full credit equilibrium, deﬁned by the intersection
of (1 − γ)yFC








The following Proposition describes the equilibria that hold when the credit re-
striction is partially or fully lifted (see Figure 5).





L < ˆ b
EC. (2.36)
1) If credit becomes available for education but not health and there exists
33a skilled equilibrium bEC
E , then the dynamical system (2.19) has two equilibria,
bEC
E and b∗
L, corresponding to skilled and unskilled work. At bEC
E , skilled work is
chosen. The equilibrium expenditures on health is
h
EC
E =m i n {b
EC
E ,˜ hE}, (2.37)
which is suboptimal if bEC











a second best equilibrium in which investment in education is optimal given the
investment in health. Bequests, expenditures on health and education, and second
period income, are greater than at the skilled equilibrium b∗
E if this exists.
2) If the credit restriction is fully relaxed, the skilled equilibrium bFC becomes




E = ˜ hE, (2.39)
e
FC
E =˜ eE. (2.40)
343. Conclusions
We have given evidence that there are minimum levels of well-being and health,
or child development, below which the young cannot aspire to become skilled.
When unskilled wages are too low for families to provide their children with these
minimum levels of well-being, and these cannot be ﬁnanced, a poverty trap exists
in which the poor remain unskilled. In this situation, it may well happen that
ﬁnance for education is not enough to break the cycle of poverty, and that provision
must also be made for the satisfaction of basic needs and health. Even when people
c a nc h o o s et ob es k i l l e d ,a n de v e nw h e nﬁnance is available for education, ﬁnancial
restrictions for investment in health and well-being can lead to suboptimal levels
of human capital investment in health and education.
It is worth noting that diﬀerent threshold levels may exist for diﬀerent levels of
education. Although we have mainly discussed basic needs and basic education,
it is probable that some higher minimum threshold of well-being and health is
needed to meet the cognitive and other requirements of a higher education. Thus
even an economy in which people have access to basic education may be trapped
away from acquiring a full complement of professional level skills, an ever more
pressing requirement of economic growth.
35The credit constraints, or the lack of ﬁnancing that exists for the satisfaction
o fb a s i cn e e d sa n dh e a l t ha r ee v e nm o r eb i n d i n gt h a nt h o s ew h i c he x i s tf o re d -
ucation, since they involve basic consumption. This, together with the critical
role that health plays in the formation of human capital, strengthens the credit
constraint explanation for the eﬀects of distribution on economic growth. The
close connection between basic consumption and investment in human capital im-
plies that this market failure may only be dissolvable through direct public policy
interventions.
Consistently with the predictions of our model, the cross-country distribution
of life expectancy is twin-peaked. Thus the phenomenon we point to may operate
on a widespread scale. Studies of the impact of children’s health on income and
economic growth must speciﬁcallly take into account the possibility of multiple
equilibria, and explore whether health and nutrition are amongst the channels
through which wealth –or poverty– are transmitted accross generations.
The link between health and education implies that a low level of satisfaction
of basic needs can lead through its impact on education and skill acquisition to
persistent income inequality. Thus health may play a causal role in the persis-
t e n c eo fp o v e r t ya n di ns e c u l a rc h a n g e si ni n e q u a l i t y .C o n v e r s e l y ,t h es a m el i n k
contributes to explain the important and long-term impact that health improve-
36ments have on economic growth. Nutrition and health are factors enabling the
formation of skills which are essential both to productivity and technical change.
To achieve optimal human capital investment, policies promoting education
must be carefully complemented with policies promoting the satisfaction of basic
needs and health, beginning in early childhood.
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Table 1. Average Annual Economic Growth Rate According to Initial Life Expectancy Category 
 
Initial Life Expectancy  [30, 40)  [40, 50)  [50, 60)  [60, 70)  [70, 80) 
1960-1980 % Average Annual Growth  0.43  2.55  3.43  3.46  3.19 
1960-1980 Observations  17  41  14  30  8 
1980-1998 % Average Annual Growth  -2.21  -0.45  0.33  0.81  2.03 




Life Expectancy Histograms for a Sample of 101 Countries 
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Figure 5. Example of multiple equilibria 
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E b   under a 
policy lifting the credit restriction through educational 
credit (EC) only. In this case a skilled equilibrium 
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E b  
exists without credit, although this need not be the case. 
The full credit (FC) equilibrium is  FC b .  
 
 
 
 
 
 